



**MEDITERRANEAN
RAIL FREIGHT CORRIDOR**
Spain-France-Italy-Slovenia-Croatia-Hungary

Modane Disruption July 3rd - July 22nd 2019

Key issues and ICM Lesson Learned



Co-financed by the Connecting Europe
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Aim of this study

- ❑ Prepare a **Return on Experience** analysis of the Modane Disruption in order to
 - ❑ answer the request of DG Move
 - ❑ propose **improvements to the ICM handbook**
 - ❑ improve stakeholders' own ICM processes
- ❑ To achieve these goals, the following tasks were performed:
 - ❑ drafting of the timeline of facts
 - ❑ identification of the **difference** between the **ICM handbook** and the “**Modane**” **process**
 - ❑ identification of **questions / proposals** on specific items of the ICM process
- ❑ This study will be used also for an **exchange of views with RUs**, to better understand their choices and issues and to improve future coordination

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The incident

On the evening of July 2nd a mudslide, due to the storms of the previous days, interrupted* the rail traffic between Saint Michel de Maurienne and Modane in the Maurienne Valley (railway link Italy – France in the Alps via Modane). Several weeks were needed to stabilize the mountain side and re-open the tracks.



* The traffic had been previously stopped on this line due to a forecast of heavy rain

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Context of the incident

- ❑ **1st international incident** since the implementation of the ICM handbook
- ❑ **Strong constraints** on diversion routes:
 - ❑ France, Italy and Switzerland: **summer period** (a lot of traffic on the Mediterranean coast, less drivers available in Switzerland)
 - ❑ **Italy:** - planned works on the identified diversionary line (partly postponed for Ventimiglia but not for Arma di Taggia)
- national strike on July 24th
 - ❑ **Switzerland:** - no chlorine transport allowed
- no possibility of parking trains (RUs had to secure capacity throughout the route)
- ❑ Diversionary routes mainly involved a **third country** (Switzerland), leading RU resources constraints
- ❑ At the time of the incident, the **ICM Handbook** had not yet been transposed into **SNCF Réseau's processes**. Nevertheless, the spirit of the ICM Handbook was respected (information and information deadline, contact between IMs, search for common solutions)

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Key figures

Key figures

Modane disruption

Closure date:	03 July 2019	
Re-opening date	22 July 2019	
Duration:	20 days	
Planned freight trains ¹	539	
of which		
rolling motorways (AFA + VIIA)	140	
Other freight trains	399	
Re-routed trains ²	51	9% of all planned freight trains
of which		13% (excluded rolling motoways)
via Swiss (Domo - Bale)	23	
via Swiss (Chiasso - Bale)	20	
via Ventimiglia	8	

Sources: ¹ Houat (SNCF R) + RFI TT dept.

² estimate by Med RFC based on information received by involved IMs and RUs

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ICM lessons learned

Regarding the ICM Process

Regarding the Communication flow

Regarding the Process Effectiveness

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ICM lessons learned

ICM Process - 1

- ❑ Rerouting process needs to be **enlarged to other RFCs** and to **other routes**.
Re-routing alternatives: **European Network approach** vs individual RFC's ICM
- ❑ **ICM Contact List** (IMs, RFCs, RUs, ...) at European level to be periodically updated and distributed to all national IMs' control centers, to be used in full for ICM first declaration (better more than less) and as a basis for the following communication.
- ❑ More formalized organisation within ICM suggested
 - ❑ an **ICM responsible** to be formally appointed by leading IM as soon as ICM is declared (one for operations and one for communication)
 - ❑ **Contact Persons** to be appointed by **each involved IM** and by involved **RFCs'**
- ❑ On national level, **strict connection** with the **local authorities** having the power of rule on the impacted territory to be maintained by leading IM, as performed in the Modane incident
- ❑ **RFC support role** without operational functions

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ICM lessons learned

ICM Process - 2

- ❑ Confirmed the need of a **common language (English)** for effective ICM communication among the parts, in communication and Telcos (at least one English speaking person for each part). National languages as facilitating tools in information exchanges.
- ❑ **International coordination to be managed by leading IM** (instead of coordinating RFC as is currently foreseen in ICM handbook) with:
 - ❑ **ICM's Telcos management** by leading IM, with Agenda distributed in advance, Telco's management by an appointed Telco's Chairman taking care of covering all the issues, collection of attendance list, set-up of the minutes (to be published after ICM's end in the Final Report)

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ICM lessons learned

ICM Process - 3

- ❑ Leading IM, with the support of other IMs and of the RFC, takes care of
 - ❑ **involvement of the RUs** in the process, collection of their needs and priorities
 - ❑ collection from involved IMs of **planned trains' catalogues** and set-up and publication of **re-routed trains' catalogue**
 - ❑ monitoring and collection of **daily re-routed trains** and the publication at the end of an **ICM detailed report**

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ICM lessons learned

ICM Communication flow

- ❑ External Communication process to be **coordinated timely by the ICM Responsible**
- ❑ Definition of a **page on the leading IM's website** where updated information can be found, with a **national and an English version**
- ❑ Specific information published both **for passengers and freight**

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ICM lessons learned

ICM Effectiveness

- ❑ Rerouting possibilities to be offered in **shorter time**: timing is critical especially at ICM's start-up, with loaded trains seeking for alternative solutions. As IMs will offer capacity based on the needs of RUs, also RUs have to express their needs in a shorter time
- ❑ Alternative routes are **not always viable** in terms of **available paths, required resources** (locos and drivers) and **costs** (few slots via Ventimiglia, resources and cost issues through Switzerland) to the impacted RUs. Therefore
 - ❑ **fair and common rules at European level** for sharing an **adequate level of capacity** on alternative routes and **to assure the required resources** (locos and drivers) **at a cost which can be met by the RUs** have to be defined
 - ❑ to minimize the impact to End Users and increase the reliability of rail transportation, also **alternative solutions via Road or Short Sea** should be considered